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U.S. Policy in the Bretton
Woods Era
I
T IS A SPECIAL PLEASURE for me to give
the Homer Jones lecture before this distinguish-
ed audience, many of them Homer’s friends.
I first met Homer in 1964 when he invited me
to give a seminar at the Bank. At the time, I was
a visiting professor at the University of Chicago,
on leave from Carnegie-Mellon. Karl Brunner
and I had just completed a study of the Federal
Reserve’s monetary policy operations for Con-
gressman Patman’s House Banking Committee.
Given its auspices, the study caught the atten-
tion of many within the Federal Reserve. It was
not surprising, then, that Homer invited me to
visit. The report had raised issues in which
Homer had a long-standing interest. One of these
was the issue of monetary control procedures.
Although Homer was sympathetic to our
criticisms, he was not easily persuaded about
our proposals—such as monetary base control.
Later, knowing him much better, 1 would say
he was not easily persuaded about very much.
You had to convince Homer with facts. He re-
spected facts much more than clever arguments.
Homer’s concern for facts never left him. It is
not an accident that under his leadership, the
economic staff at St. Louis began publishing
those data triangles that economists all over the
world now rely on when they want to know
what has happened to monetary growth and
the growth of other non-monetary aggregates. 1
am persuaded that the publication and wide
dissemination of these facts in the 1960s and
1970s did much more to get the monetarist case
accepted than we usually recognize. 1 don’t think
Homer was surprised at that outcome. He be-
lieved in the power of ideas, but he believed
that ideas were made powerful by their cor-
respondence to facts.
When Karl Brunner and I started the Shadow
Open Market Committee, we invited Homer to
be a member. He was a valuable and conscien-
tious member who came to the meetings for
many years armed with the kind of penetrating
questions that one learned to expect from him.
When he believed that his energy had declined
and he could not contribute as fully and force-
fully as in the past, he offered to resign. We
persuaded him to stay on. He remained through
the first ten years, leaving after the September
1983 meeting, only a few years before his death
in 1986.
One of the facts about monetary policy during I
Homer’s years at the St. Louis Federal Reserve
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Bretton Woods system, in fact at the center of
the system. Bretton Woods and international
monetary policy were not major concerns of
the Federal Reserve however) despite the formal
commitment to the system and the responsibili-
ty implied by the role of the dollar. The failure
to honor the commitment is one part of the in-
flationary policies of that period. I am pleased
to review and interpret the main facts about
that experience in this lecture in honor of
Homer Jones.
In the 45 years following World War 11, there
was a remarkable transformation of the interna-
tional monetary system. At the war’s end, the
dollar was the dominant currency for interna-
tional transactions and was universally held as a
reserve asset or store of value. The Bretton
Woods system recognized this role by making
the dollar the principal reserve currency of the
international system with the British pound as a
second reserve currency. Exchange rates of
other currencies were fixed to the dollar but
were adjustable under conditions defined by the
agreement. But, by 1971 the Bretton Woods
system was in shambles, and in 1973 major
countries agreed to experiment with fluctuating
exchange rates.
This paper is about the history of U.S. inter-
national economic policy under Bretton Woods
from 1959 to 1973. The period begins with the
recognition of a problem that was to become
the central problem of the international mone-
tary system for the next decade. At first, the
problem was seen as a temporary balance of
payments problem—the inability of the United
States to balance its trade and payments at the
prevailing fixed exchange rates. The end of this
historical era is fixed by the decision in March
1973 to abandon fixed exchange rates between
principal currencies. The starting point, 1959, is
the year major currencies became convertible,
subject in many cases to restrictions on capital
movements that were increased or relaxed as
reserve positions changed.
Soon after the start of the period, and at the
end, policymakers expressed concern about the
competitive position of the U.S. economy. This
concern about competitiveness returns again
and again in the next four decades, although
the focus of concern and the principal manifes-
tation of the alleged problem shift. The alleged
cause in 1959-60 was trade discrimination,
which had been accepted by the United States
at the end of the war to assist in the recovery
from wartime destruction abroad. Soon after,
the costs of foreign assistance and foreign
military expenditures were added as causes. By
the late 1960s these concerns and concern
about foreign investment led successive adminis-
trations to restrict payments to foreigners by
means such as the interest equalization tax,
taxes on tourist expenditures, “buy America”
programs, and “temporary” controls of foreign
investment. Inflationary financing of the war in
Vietnam and of domestic social spending more
than offset any effect these programs may have
had on the equilibrium value of the fixed,
nominal exchange rate. Increasingly, the pro-
blem came to be seen as an exchange rate pro-
blem, specifically an overvalued dollar. As the
Bretton Woods system ended, the dollar was
first devalued against gold and major curren-
cies, then allowed to fluctuate.
In the U.S. system, principal responsibility for
international economic policy rests with the
Treasury. The Federal Reserve is formally of
secondary importance. Under Bretton Woods
the Federal Reserve’s main responsibility was to
conduct monetary policy so as to maintain the
fixed exchange rate agreed to by the administra-
tion. There is no specific legislative authoriza-
tion for the Federal Reserve to buy and sell
foreign currencies (Schwartz 1991). But the
Federal Reserve had a larger, informal role. Of-
ficials and staff participated in international
meetings, gave advice and counsel on what
were seen to be the principal problems of the
Bretton Wood system, and proposed solutions.
They participated, as observers, at the regular
meetings of the Bank for International Set-
tlements, where central bankers held regular
discussions and reviews of U.S. policies. There
is little evidence, however, of any systematic ef-
fort by the Federal Reserve to conduct
monetary policy in a manner consistent with
the requirements of a fixed exchange rate
system. And, there is no evidence that any of
the administrations objected to this neglect. On
the contrary, from the Kennedy to the Nixon
administrations, domestic economic policy objec-
tives, though frequently changed, were of over-
riding interest.
THE UNITED STATES IN THE
BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM
The Bretton Woods agreement of 1944
established a system of fixed exchange rates


















MAY/JUNE 1991agreement was the product of extensive negotia-
tions, with much of the work done by the United
States and British Treasuries. The intention of
the drafters, principally John Maynard Keynes
in Britain and Harry Dexter White in the United
States, was to establish a set of rules to replace
the rules of the international gold standard and
to avoid the rigidity of that system. Because the
British feared that the United States would re-
turn to the protectionist and deflationary
policies of the interwar years, there were
safeguards against that occurrence. U.S. infla-
tion was considered unlikely or, more accurate-
ly, was not considered at all, so there were no
rules for adjustment to prevent inflation from
spreading to countries in the fixed exchange
rate system.
The agreement obligated countries to in-
tervene to keep their currencies within 1 per-
cent of their fixed but adjustable (dollar) parities.
As the principal reserve currency, the United
States was obligated to buy and sell gold for
dollars (or convertible currency) at the $35
price. When the system started, the United States
held about ¾ of the world’s monetary gold stock.
Currencies other than the dollar were inconver-
tible. By t960, the U.S. gold stock had fallen,
but the U.S. still held $20 billion, almost half of
all monetary gold. In the early years, the United
States’s loss of gold was looked on favorably as
a step toward convertibility. By the end of 1958,
major currencies had become convertible for
current transactions.’
The strengthening of foreign economies was a
major aim of early postwar U.S. economic
policy. At first, balance of payments deficits,
foreign accumulation of dollars, and the redistri-
bution of the gold stock were seen as desirable
steps toward a viable international monetary
system. By 1960, official concern about con-
tinued U.S. payments deficits began to be cx-
pressed.’ The President’s Economic Report for
1960, the last report prepared by the Eisenhower
administration, discusses the competitive pro-
blems of the steel and automobile industries in
world markets during 1959 and the growth of
U.S. investment abroad, problems that were to
remain for years to come (ERP, 1960).’ Sug-
gested remedies are limited to pro-competitive
‘Germany permitted convertibility on capital account at the
same time. The Japanese yen did not become convertible
on current account until 1964.
‘For the year 1959 as a whole, the U.S. balance on current
account was negative, -$1.3 billion, for the first time since
1953.
policies, such as the removal of quantitative
restrictions against imports from the United
States, and to recommendations that foreign
governments increase lending to developing
countries.
The major problem at the time was not a U.S.
current account deficit. Throughout the 1960s,
the United States typically had a surplus on cur-
rent account. The problem was that the trade
and current account surpluses were not large
enough to finance net private investment abroad
plus military, travel, and foreign aid spending
abroad. To settle the balance, the United States
either had to sell gold or accumulate dollar lia-
bilities to foreigners. As the gold reserve declined
and liabilities rose, concern increased that the
liabilities would become too large relative to the
gold reserve to maintain confidence that the
gold price would remain fixed. Under Bretton
Woods rules, foreigners had the option of con-
verting dollars into gold; the United States had
responsibility for keeping the gold price fixed
by permitting conversions and, at a more basic
level, adjusting the production of dollars to main-
tain confidence in future gold convertibility.
This part of the agreement was an early casual-
ty. As foreign liabilities rose, restrictions were
placed on gold sales to private holders and pres-
sure or persuasion was used to discourage cen-
tral banks and governments from converting
dollars into gold.
Deficits and foreign dollar accumulation was
not the only problem in the system as seen by
U.S. policymakers at the time. A steady surplus
in the U.S. balance of payments would have
transferred gold and dollars to the United States.
Since dollar balances were part of foreign
reserves, hut not U.S. reserves, total world
reserves would fall. A U.S. surplus was seen as
undesirable, therefore. Under a U.S. payments
deficit, conversion of dollars into gold left world
reserves unchanged but lowered the gold re-
serves behind the principal reserve currency.
With growing foreign trade, and an implicit
assumption that imbalances increase with trade,
reserves would prove inadequate to finance im-
balances at fixed exchange rates and a fixed
gold price.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0plus the commitment to reduce internal trade
barriers as part of a common market stimulated
U.S. investment in Europe.4 Hence, a capital in-
flow augmented the stock of foreign exchange
reserves in countries outside the United States.
In the two years 1958 and 1959, gold and dollar
reserves of the principal European countries in-
creased by $5 billion, about 25 percent of total
U.S. reserve assets at the end of the period.~
There were four possible solutions (Friedman,
1953): (1) devaluation against gold and major
currencies, (2) deflation, (3) borrow as long as
foreigners would lend, and (4) impose controls
of various kinds. Several of these solutions
could be achieved in different ways. For exam-
ple, foreigners could revalue against the dollar.
Or, foreigners could inflate faster than the
United States, thereby changing the relative
prices of domestic and foreign goods at fixed
exchange rates.
Policies of the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations
Under Bretton Woods rules countries were
permitted to devalue up to 10 percent without
consultation when faced with “fundamental
disequilibrium.” The precise conditions char-
acterizing fundamental disequilibrium were not
spelled out, and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) did nothing to clarify the conditions. The
drafters had wanted to avoid both the inflex-
ibility of the classical gold standard and the
competitive devaluations of the interwar period.
The language may have been intended to permit
devaluation if the alternative was deflation while
avoiding devaluation if a country could expect
to restore payments’ balance and repay a short-
or medium-term adjustment loan.
Devaluations by major countries occurred. In
the early years several countries followed the
United Kingdom in a 30% devaluation in 1949,
France devalued by 29 percent in 1958, and the
United Kingdom devalued again in 1967. The
United States chose to regard its problem as less
than “fundamental.” President Kennedy came in-
to office committed to maintain the $35 gold
price but also to “get the economy moving”
after the relatively slow growth and two reces-
sions in the previous four years. The commit-
ment to a fixed nominal gold price ruled out
devaluation of the dollar against gold and all
other currencies; the commitment to higher
economic growth removed the classical remedy,
deflation of domestic prices and costs of pro-
duction to raise the real dollar value of the U.S.
gold stock and lower the relative price of U.S.
exports. That left borrowing, controls and for-
eign inflation as the principal options.
The decision to avoid devaluation and defla-
tion reflects some strongly held views of the
period. The $35 gold price was seen as a firm
commitment under the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment. If the United States devalued once, it
could do so again, with costs to the stability
that Bretton Woods was supposed to provide.
Avoiding repetition of the experience with defla-
tion in the early 1930s and the decade-long
depression was a major factor in the passage of
the Employment Act and the Bretton Woods
agreement. Few wished to repeat the prewar
experience even in milder form. Hence, the
Kennedy administration met little opposition
from business or political groups in excluding
the price options, devaluation and deflation.~
Kennedy’s main domestic campaign theme had
been getting the economy “moving” after the
relatively slow average growth rate of the se-
cond Eisenhower administration. The Kennedy
administration policies emphasized domestic
growth, full employment and price stability as
their major aims and relied on a so-called fiscal
monetary mix to stimulate output while reduc-
ing the capital outflow. In practice, this trans-
lated into a series of tax measures—faster de-
preciation for capital, an investment tax credit
and, later, reductions in personal and corporate
tax rates. To limit the capital outflow, the ad-
ministration tried to prevent a sharp countem-
cyclical decline in interest rates during the early
months of the recovery from the 1960-61 reces-
4See EAt’ (1959).
‘Total U.S. reserve assets include the total U.S. gold stock
and its reserve position in the International Monetary
Fund. At the end of 1959, these balances were $19.5 and
$2.0 billion respectively. EAt’ (1971).
6The Kennedy Treasury led by Douglas Dillon and Robert
Roosa was firmly opposed to devaluation. Dillon was an in-
vestment banker, and a Republican, who had served as
ambassador to France. Roosa had been a senior econo-
mist at the N.Y. Fed and was very attracted to activist
policies whether in domestic credit markets or international
markets. At the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA),
Walter Heller was mainly interested in domestic policy.
Heller (1966) says very little about the dollar problem other
than noting that the balance of payments required higher
short-term interest rates. Kennedy saw the problem as a
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Figure 2a
Federal Funds Rate During the 1960s
Percent
sion.~In cooperation with the Federal Reserve,
the Treasury attempted to “twist” the yield curve
by buying long-term bonds and selling short-
term ‘I’reasury bills.’ Since the market for
government securities is very active and highly
competitive, participants were able to reverse
any temporary change in interest rates achieved
by the twist.
Neither- money growth nor interest rates
shows evidence of “tight money” in the early
1960s. Figure 2a shows the federal funds rate
for that decade. The funds rate is the rate most
tightly controlled by the Federal Reserve. From
1961 to 1966, the rate rose slowly, and it did
not exceed 3 percent until late in 1963. Figure
2h shows the growth rate of the monetary base for the same period. The growth rate is com-
I 7See Heller (1966), p. 5.






puted as the percentage rate of change from
the corresponding month of the preceding year.
Shortly after the Kennedy administration came
into office, growth of the base rose to about
1-112 to 2 percent. By mid-1963 the growth rate
of the base was consistently above the long-
term growth of output, 3 percent per annum.
Growth of the base continued to rise in 1964.
\%‘ith the possible exception of 1961-62, base
growth shows no evidence that monetary policy
was relatively restrictive. In fact, base growth,
far from being deflationary, was inconsistent
with continuation of the relatively low rate of
inflation inherited from the past. To prevent
higher inflation, the Kennedy administration in-
troduced informal guidelines for prices and
wages. The prevailing view was set out in the
plausible assumption that the additional distribution cost
would be treated by the market as a rise in the effective






































1962 Economic Report of the President. In this
view, a relatively stable Phillips curve permitted
policymakers to trade higher inflation for lower
unemployment. The price and wage guidelines
~vere supposed to improve the trade-off by
reducing wage and pt-ice increases as the
economy approached full employment.
A slow recovery gave way in 1963 to robust
real growth. Inflation remained low. Until 1965,
the fixed weight deflator rose between 1 per-
cent and 1-1/2 percent annually and the con-
sumer price index between 3/4 percent and 2
percent. Inflation was generally higher abroad,
so relative prices of U.S. goods declined. Figure
3 shows the ratio of the U.S. consumer price in-
dex to a trade-weighted average of consumer
prices abroad, based on the weights in Federal
Reserve index of nominal exchange rates. The
index shows the sustained relative decline in the
U.S. price level during the first half of the
decade. With few exceptions, the ratio declined
monthly until 1966. CPIs are relatively com-
prehensive measures but, as is well known, not
perfect measures of traded goods and services.
Doubtless there are temporal differences bet-
ween the price ratio in figure 3 and ratios com-
puted using other prices, but the pattern of per-
sistent decline would be little affected.
Under the impact of relative price changes
and other factors, the merchandise trade balance
increased. U.S. capital investment abroad con-
tinued to rise and domestic and foreign bor-
rowers used the U.S. market to raise funds for
investment abroad, so the capital outflow
continued.
Special Measures
From 1960 on, each administration sustained
or strengthened controls on trade and payments
intended to reduce the balance of payments
deficit.’ At first, the measures consisted of
‘Various definitions were used but the official settlements
balance appears to have been the main concern. This
balance consists of current account plus long-term capital
flows plus net private short-term capital flows. I report this
balance from time to time in the text, but I base my judg-
ments much more on the current account balance. The
concern about profitable investment abroad puzzles me;
investment of this kind produces a subsequent inflow.
Also, the current account balance is more useful for com-
parison of the fixed and fluctuating rate periods. On the
role of the current account see Corden (1990).
I
I





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Selected Balance of Payments Measures
~Actual and Proposed)
1960 Expansion of Expon-Import Bark lending ana guarantees of non-commercral risks
Reduction in mil’tary depenoents abroad (repealed in 19611
Reduction in defense and nan-defense government purchases abroad
1961 Offsets for miRtary expend;ture in Europe ano adoi’tioral procurement at home
Tieing development aid to doilar purchases.
I—creased taxes on foreign earnings of U.S. corporations.
Reduced allowance for tourist purchases abroad from $500 to $100.
Treasur? inlervc-nuon n foreign exchange markets.
Repayment of German loans.
1962 Expansion of earlier programs
Offset purchases by Germany and Italy
Increased borrowing authority for the IMF
Beginning of Federal Reserve “swap” arrangements to’ currencies Treasury issues foreign denom,nated securities
1963 An interest equahzation tax o1 i’Ve on foreign borrowers In ~ market
Additional lieing of foreign aid to domestic purchases
1965 Interest Equal zation Tax on bank bars with duration of one year or more made to bor-
rowers in developed countries (except Canada)
Limits on growth of bank lending to foreigners.
Encourage private companies to increase exports and repatrtate earmngs.
Guidelines for direct investment by non-financial corporations to limit growth of foregn
direct investment
1967 Perm~thtgher tax rates (up to 2°/c)for interest equalization tax.
Expansion of lending authority of Export-Import Bank.
Source EconomiC Report of the President various years
Controls and restrictions were, at best, a short-
term solution. Most of the controls and restric-
tions in table I were introduced as temporary
measures, although several were extended and
strengthened when renewed. Even if these mea-
sures had succeeded in stemming the balance of
payments deficit, they did not offer a perma-
nent solution at a new equilibrium without con-
trols. The problem would have returned when
the controls were removed.
loans of foreign currencies and dollars. Typical-
ly the Federal Reserve borrowed to purchase
dollars held abroad instead of selling gold.bo
Swaps are a short-term accommodation. To re-
pay the swaps, the Treasury began borrowing
from foreign central banks at longer terms us-
ing bonds denominated in foreign currencies.
The proceeds from the bond sales (called Roosa
bonds) helped to repay the swaps without re-
ducing the U.S. gold stock, again postponing the
problem. Lending facilities of the IMF were ex-
panded under the General Agreements to Bor-
row. The agreements provided that 10 countries
would lend under specified conditions to aug-
ment the Fund’s resources. This is the origin of
the group of 10 (G-10).” Again, these were
mainly short-term measures.









To smooth fluctuations in the gold price and
short-term capital movements, the ‘Freasury in-
troduced several measures. Eight countries join-
ed a gold pool in 1961 to stabilize the London
gold market. Reciprocal credit agreements (call-
ed “swaps”) with foreign central banks and the
Bank for International Settlements provided
105ee Solomon (1982), p. 42.
“Canada, Japan, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom. United States.
1
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The United States supplied 60 percent of the
gold sold in the London gold market; the other
members of G-I0 were supposed to provide the
rest. Foreign countries replaced some of their
sales by purchases from the United States, so
the U.S. contribution to the pool, direct and in-
direct, became a major cause of the decline in
the U.S. gold stock. In March 1968, with U.S.
gold reserves under $11 billion, the gold pool
was abandoned. The price of gold for official
transactions remained at $35, but the G-10 gov-
ernments did not attempt to control the price
for private transactions. To prevent arbitrage,
foreign central banks agreed not to sell in the
gold market.
For the years 1960-67 as a whole, the non-U.S.
members of the G-10 (including Switzerland) ac-
quired 150 million ounces of gold, an increase
of one-third over their holdings at the end of
1960.12 Every country except Britain and Canada
added to its stocks. Britain sold 38 million ounces,
the U.S. 164 million ounces. France acquired
more than 100 million ounces, two-thirds of the
total acquisition by U-b countries.”
The year 1966 is the peak year for gold hold-
ings of the G-I0, excluding the United States,
and 1965 is the peak year for the eleven coun-
tries, measured in ounces of gold. In these years,
the value of the stock at $33 per ounce was ap-
proximately $15 billion. The value of the U.S.
stock was approximately $13 billion, about equal
to the non-gold foreign exchange holdings of
the other members of the U-lU. After 1968, non-
U.S. members of the U-b as a group reduced
their stocks slightly until 1971, but several ac-
quired gold in the market. The embargo can be
said to have succeeded in this limited sense.
Also in 1961, the ‘Treasury’s Exchange Stabili-
zation Fund (ESF) began operations in foreign
currencies for the first time since the 1930s.
The F’ederal Reserve joined in these operations
in 1962, and in 1963 the Fed began lending
dollars to the Treasury secured by Treasury
holdings of foreign exchange. These so-called
“~‘varehousing”operations permitted the Trea-
sury to expand its purchases of foreign ex-
change without seeking Congressional appropri-
‘2Abb data on gold are from IMF (1990), p. 65.
“1967 is the peak for France’s accumulation of gold. The
following
year France sold 40 million ounces to defend the
franc’s parity following the riots and disturbances.
‘4The analogy neglects the role of the pound as an alter-
native reserve currency, but its role was small and of
declining importance.
ations to support the activity. Warehousing re-
mained small in the 1960s but increased sub-
stantially in the 1980s.
Proposals for Long-Term
Adjustment
The policies of the Kennedy and Johnson ad-
ministrations may have stabilized the level of
foreign official holdings in the years 1963-66
but, as shown in figure 1 above, U.S. gold re-
serves continued to decline. A popular analogy
at the time treated the United States as a bank
for the international monetary system. Foreign
dollar holdings were considered the analogue of
bank deposits and gold the analogue of bank
reserves.14 The analogy suggests that the series
of mainly short-term, one-time or allegedly tem-
porary measures, such as the interest equaliza-
tion tax, had not solved the problem of a future
run on the bank. The gold reserve continued to
fall absolutely and relative to official (or total)
dollar clainis.
The Kennedy administration was aware of the
long-term problem. In 1962, the administration
asked economists at the Brookings Institution to
study the longer-term prospects for balance of
payments adjustment. The report took the “basic
balance”—balance on goods and services, govern-
ment payments plus long-term capital flow—as
its standard.” It projected that by 1968 this bal-
ance would be between a surplus of $1.9 billion
and a deficit of $600 million, depending on the
assumptions about growth, prices and costs at
home and abroad. This section of the report
was greeted warmly by the administration. The
projected improvement reflected the assumption
of a rise in foreign relative to domestic prices
and a slowing of U.S. investment abroad as pro-
fit rates rose in the United States relative to
abroad. The expected rise in domestic profit
rates reflected the direct effect of the Adminis-
tration’s proposed reduction in corporate tax
rates and the indirect, stimulative effect of tax
rate reductions for households and businesses.”
As shown in figure 3, a relative increase in
prices abroad occurred, but the projections pro-
ved optimistic. The recorded 1967 balance was
—$2.1 billion.”
‘~SeeSalant et.al. (1963).
“For the tax reduction to improve the basic balance, the
rise in expected real returns in the U.S. had to overcome
the expected positive effect of tax reduction on imports.

















a‘The Brookings report also considered the ef-
fects of a U.S. surplus in its basic balance on
the supply of world reserves and concluded that
either- a new source of world reserves would
have to be found, or there would have to he
greater flexibility of exchange rates. The report
discussed a dollar-pound bloc and a continental
European bloc with fixed rates inside the bloc
and fluctuating rates between the blocs.’~The
Council of Economic Advisers summary of the
Brookings study has no reference to this
discussion.
The Council of Economic Advisers argued
that, although the Bretton Woods agreement
permitted exchange rate adjustments, “for a
reserve currency country, this alternative is not
available.”° And, they added, “for other major
industrial countries, even occasional recourse to
such adjustments would induce serious specula-
tive capital movements, thereby accentuating
imhalances.”bo
With exchange rates adjustments ruled out,
only two alternatives were considered. One was
increased fiscal expansion by surplus countries
and less expansive policies for countries in defi-
cit. The other was introduction of some type of
new reserve asset. The latter proposal led even-
tually to the creation of special drawing rights
(SUR5).
This was the heyday of Keynesian policy, so it
is not surprising that Keynesian policies have a
prominent place in administration proposals.
The administration favored a policy mix and
what later became known as policy coordina-
tion. Under the fixed exchange rate system,
countries were expected to buy and sell dollars
to maintain their exchange rate. The economic
reports of the President for the period assumed,
however, that countries can adjust capital flow
by varying the mix of fiscal and monetary poli-
cies. The ERP argues that “flexible changes in
the mix of fiscal and monetary policies can serve
to reconcile internal and external policy goals.””
For the United States, the prescription was tax
reduction to expand domestic spending while
holding short-term interest rates high to reduce
short-term capital outflow. Surplus countries
with strong domestic demand were called upon
to raise tax rates or lower government spending
and expand money growth to lower interest
rates. The idea was that the inflationary conse-
quences of domestic monetary expansion ~•vould
he reduced or avoided by the restrictive fiscal
policy.
The International Monetary Fund’s annual
report for the period offers similar advice, but
it warns of an inflationary bias. Surplus coun-
tries are subject to upward adjustment of wages
and prices) hut deficit countries are riot sub-
ject to downward adjustments.22 ‘The IMF recog-
nized that world trade had grown faster than
the gold stock, hut they limited their recommen-
dation to a study of possible future needs.23
The Germans, to whom the recommendation
for monetary expansion and fiscal restraint was
often directed, were skeptical about the policy
mix proposals. Their expressed concern was the
inflationary consequences of U.S. money growth.
They held to a more classical view that the prob-
blem was expansionary U.S. monetary policy, so
it must be solved by restrictive policies in the
United States, not expansive German policies.
Their skepticism about “coordination” became a
persistent feature of the policy dialogue under
both fixed and fluctuating exchange rates.
Initially the German response was to discourage
capital inflows. For example, German banks were
required to hold relatively high reserve require-
ments against foreigners’ deposits. The Germans
argued, against the spirit of the Bretton Woods
agreement, that deficit countries should adjust.
They opposed revaluation of the mark even
more strongly than they opposed domestic ex-
pansion, since they could avoid revaluation but
could avoid expansive monetary policy only by
imposing severe restrictions on capital inflows.
After much delay, and many denials, Germany
revalued the mark by 9.3 percent in October
1969.24 With the revaluation, Germany removed
many of the border taxes and special reserve
requirements on foreign deposits in German




The mark had been revalued by 5 percent in 1961.
Solomon (1962), p. 162, reports the May 1969 statement
given by a German official that the decision to not revalue
was “final, unequivocal and for eternity.’’ This is one of
many strong denials during the period.
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“See Salant et.ab. (1963).
“See ERP (1964), p. 139. 2°bbid
“See ERP (1964), p. 143.






~fltOAi o5e~Ow~ flxi’Jl( OF ST tfltfbS aWhile urging German revaluation, the United
States increased money growth in 1968. After
the German revaluation, the Federal Reserve
shifted to a more restrictive policy, raising the
Federal funds rate (figure 2a) and slowing the
growth of the monetary base. The sharp con-
traction in the growth of the base was followed
by the start of a recession in the fourth quarter.
The reduction in money growth, the increase in
U.S. real rates of interest, and the recession
helped to shift the current account balance to-
ward surplus. By the middle of 1970 the quar-
terly balance had returned to a level not
reached since the latter part of 1965.
Proposals to increase Liquidity
ings during the middle b960s, and dollar
liabilities had continued to rise relative to the
U.S. gold stock. The United States argued that it
expected to bring its payment deficits to an end.
When this happened, the world trading system
would lack an adequate supply of reserves to
finance future demand for reserve assets at the
fixed gold price. Hence, the United States
favored creation of a new reserve asset that
could be increased with world trade or world
demand for reserves.
Data in the IMF’ report, however, do not show
a general problem of liquidity at the time. ‘The
IMF used reserves as a percentage of imports to
measure liquidity—on the usual assumptions
that reserves are used to finance imbalances
and imbalances increase with trade. The data
show that there was no general shortage of li-
quidity on this measure. The problem was lim-
ited mainly to the United States and the United
Kingdom. Table 2 shows these data. Reserves in-
clude gold, foreign exchange and reserve posi-
tion at the IMF.
I
flows to Germany.” After the revaluation Ger-
man prices rose more slowly than U.S. prices.
The experience of the late b960s had a lasting
effect on German monetary policy. After the
mark re-entered a fixed exchange rate system
with the principal continental European coun-
tries in the late b970s, Germany revalued more
frequently to avoid inflation and exchange con-
trols. In the late 1960s, however, revaluation
was delayed too long and was much too small



















This argument is, at best, incomplete. If the
United States had a payments surplus, other
countries would have deficits. The United States
could add to reserves by buying other stable
currencies, just as these countries bought dol-
lars. The Economic Report recognizes that this
argument is correct. Even if each country was
in balance, the United States could buy foreign
exchange for dollars to augment its reserves.’8
The IMF combined the liquidity and adjust-
ment issues. They argued that the creation of a
new reserve asset and additional reserves re-
duced the need for deficit countries to adjust
and increased the pressure on surplus countries
to adjust.” This is, of course, an argument for
inflation as a solution to the adjustment prob-
lem for the deficit countries and revaluation as
the remedy for the surplus countries. This pro-
gram was asymmetric; world inflation would in-
crease but not decline.
“Adjustment” was one of a triad of topics dis-
cussed at numerous official and unofficial inter-
national meetings. The other topics were “li-
quidity” and “confidence.” Liquidity received the
most attention.
Proposals for additional liquidity differed. The
French position was one extreme, the U.S. posi-
tion the other. The International Monetary Fund
took a position close to that of the United States.
Positions did not remain fixed, hut they were
never fully reconciled.”
The U.S. position was that a new reserve asset
was needed to supplement the stock of gold
and dollars. Sales from official holdings in the
London gold market had reduced official hold-
“See Solomon (1982), p. 164.
“Other parity changes during the second half ofthe 1960s
include an 11.1 percent devaluation of the French franc in
1968 and a 14.3 percent devaluation ofthe British pound
in 1967. Many of the sterling bloc devalued following
Britain.
“Solomon (1982) gives a thorough account of the discus-
sions, proposals and the meetings ofvarious official groups.
Solomon was a senior civil servant at the Federal Reserve
with responsibility for international finance and an active
participant or observer at most of the discussions.
“See Economic Report (1964), p. 145.
“See IMF (1966), p. 10.
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the United States aside, world reserves were
a larger percentage of imports in 1965 than in
1951 and not very different in 1965 than in
1959. The IMF notes that the ratio of reserves
to imports fluctuated around a constant value.”
Among major countries, only the United King-
dom shows a relatively low ratio. For many
countries, the ratio had converged to 40 to 50
percent.”
The French complained about the special
role of the dollar, the opportunity given to the
United States to use domestic inflation to ac-
quire foreign assets (at fixed exchange rates),
and what they called U.S. hegemony. As a first
step, they proposed to limit the size of U.S.
payments deficits that other countries were
obligated to finance, but they also sought a per-
manent arrangement under which reserve assets
would he tied to gold. Later, they urged an in-
crease in the price of gold. Jacques Rueff (1967)
proposed a doubling of the price of gold accom-
panied by commitments by the United States
and the United Kingdom to use part of the pro-
fit from revaluation to retire some of the dollar
and sterling reserves held by foreign central
banks.”
In its official proposals. the French government
did not at first go as far as Rueff in favoring an
increase in the gold price. Nor did it insist on a
return to the gold standard. It favored a larger
66
role for gold, restrictions on the financing of
U.S. deficits, and a refunding of the sterling and
dollar balances, particularly the latter.” In early
discussions, France wanted to circumvent the
IMF by creating a reserve asset for use by the
Group of 10. The new asset would have a per-
manently fixed relation to gold. ‘The effect of
this proposal was to increase the effective gold
stock and to devalue the dollar against gold.
The French proposal was not accepted. The
alternative chosen was to create a new asset. In
September 1967, at the Rio de Janeiro meeting
of the International Monetary Fund, agreement
was reached on the general principles govern-
ing creation of a supplementary reserve asset
called Special Drawing Rights (SDR5). The new
asset was to be a supplement to gold and dol-
lars. The United States was not required to
redeem dollar balances, and the gold price re-
mained fixed. SDRs could be issued only if an
85 peccent majority approved, and they would
be held only by official holders, central banks
and international monetary institutions. Finally,
in July 1969, the amendments to the IMF agree-
ment were ratified by a sufficient number of
members to come into effect. At the Rio meeting
of the IMF, the first allocations were agreed to
hut not issued.
In the IMF view, reserves were “less than ade-
quate.”4 ‘The report acknowledged that “the
signals were conflicting.” The principal argu-
ment for more reserves is that non-tariff bar-
riers, aid-tying, domestic preference and other
trade restrictions had increased. At the time, no
argument was made about the relation of re-
serves to trade or imbalances. And the argument
about trade restrictions makes no effort to link
trade restrictions to the liquidity problem. In
fact, the restrictions continued in many coun-
tries after 1973.
SDRs were issued in 1970-72 and again in
1979-81. The 1970 issue added $3.1 billion to
reserves. In the same year foreign exchange
reserves increased by $14 billion, and total
reserves reached $91 billion, a5 0percent in-
crease for the decade and a2 2percent increase
for 1970.’°ln total, 21.4 billion SURs (valued in
StiR units) were issued through 1985 when new
‘°SeeIMF (1966), p. 12.
“Ibid., p. 14.
“Rueff was Economic Adviser to President DeGaubbe.
“See Solomon (1982), p. 73.
I
I
“See IMF (1969), p. 27.
“Ibid., p. 26.
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issues ceased. SDRs never became an important
means of settlement. By the time the agreement
to create SDRs had been reached, the Bretton
Woods system was in its last days.
It seems doubtful that the SDR would have
become a dominant medium of exchange or
store of international reserves if the fixed ex-
change rate system had survived. The StiR was
a specialized money but did not dominate alter-
natives as a means of payment or store of value.
Gold is an established store of value with a long
history. StiRs had to compete also with the dol-
lar and later the mark, the yen and other cur-
rencies as a reserve asset. Balances held in each
of these assets earn interest. At first, StiR bal-
ances did not earn interest, so they were less
attlactive than balances held in short-term gov-
ernment securities of the principal countries.
There was no source of revenue or earnings;
interest payments could only be made by crea-
ting additional Stills.
Table 3 shows the pattern of money growth
for a sample of countries. Many countries show
a decline in money growth from 1969 to 1970
and all show a rise from 1970 to 1971, corre-
sponding to the pattern in the United States, as
France claimed. The size of the changes differs
by country. All countries did not have the same
trade pattern, so they did not receive the same
proportional increase in base money. Some ster-
ilized part of the increase for a time, and some
countries adopted controls to reduce the inflow.
In the winter of 1971, Germany allowed its ex-
change rate to appreciate relative to the dollar,
slowing the inflow of dollars. This action recog-
nized, as France has insisted, that countries



















inflation to the rest of the world. Countries
were obligated to buy all dollars offered at a
fixed price. Sterilization of the inflow could be
successful for short-periods, but as Switzerland,
Germany and others discovered at the time, the
fixed exchange rate gave speculators an oppor-
tunity to invest in one-way gambles with low
risk and relatively high expected return. The
Swiss franc or the mark were unlikely to depre-
ciate, more likely to appreciate. Investors and
speculators knew this. Hence, flows into these
currencies became difficult to curtail.
After 1973, flexible exchange rates removed
any need for a large stock of reserves for settl-
ing balances between principal countries, although countries continued to accumulate
reserves and to intervene in the foreign ex-
change markets. The StiR could not be held by private wealthowners, so it could not be used for intervention. Further, the introduction of
StiRs did not adjust relative prices or real cx-
change rates. Failure to solve the adjustment
problem meant that the major effort to sustain
the system by producing a supplementary
reserve asset was largely wasted effort.
Additional creation of StiRs in 1972 was again
divorced from events. World reserves (net of
gold) had doubled in two years (from StiR 56 in 1970 to SDR 112 in 1972). Reserves in relation
to imports were at the highest level in the post-
war period before or after; countries held reserves equal to more than 14 weeks of im- ports at the end of 1972. In 1963, at about the
time that the discussion of additional reserves began, the ratio was equal to nine weeks. In the same period, 1963-72, total teserves (net of gold)
quadrupled in nominal value.”
The French were cortect on two points that
U.S. officials (and others) refused to acknow-
ledge. First, the Bretton Woods system based on
the dollar permitted the United States to export
“Data are from International Financial Statistics, Yearbook
1990.
The second point on which the French posi-
tion was correct was that revaluation of gold
would solve the liquidity problem. Their various
proposals would have devalued the dollar against
a MAY/JUNE 199168
other currencies, thereby providing the addition
to the stock of reserves that the StiR was sup-
posed to provide. French proposals did not limit
future changes in the price of gold, so they are
open to the charge that expectations of future
devaluation would lead to a run on the dollar
once it had been devalued. Much earlier, Keynes
(1923) had proposed a type of commodity stan-
dard in which gold served as a medium of ex-
changes. In this proposal, the gold price was
tied to an index of commodity prices. Had a
scheme of this kind been adopted, it seems like-
ly that the Bretton Woods system would have
lasted longer.
A devaluation of the dollar against gold, with
other currency values unchanged, would have
removed the liquidity problem in the 1960s. At
the end of 1968, the U.S. price level was ap-
proximately 2-1/2 times the 1929 level. If the
gold price had been raised proportionally from
its 1929 value ($20.67), the 1968 price would
have been approximately $52. At that price, the
U.S. gold reserve would have been $17.6 billion,
$1.6 billion more than U.S. liabilities to central
banks and governments.
Although adjustments in the price of gold
would have extended the life of the Bretton
Woods system, it is unclear whether the system
would have survived for more than a few addi-
tional years without some restriction on U.S.
monetary policy, restrictions that the United
States was unlikely to accept. Inflationary pol-
icies in the United States continued through the
1970s with only brief interruptions. Countries
that chose to lower inflation in the 1970s would
have had to leave the system. Further, inflation
was not the only problem. The oil shocks of
1974 and 1979 changed the terms of trade, re-
quiring changes in exchange rates that Bretton
Woods system found difficult to accommodate.
At best, devaluation ofthe dollar against gold
would have corrected for differences in produc-
tivity growth and changing costs of production
between the United States and the principal
surplus countries, Germnany and Japan. U.S.
devaluation and the oil shocks would have
changed the relative positions of other coun-
tries. Some would have found their trade bal-
ances in persistent deficit, requiring adjustment
of their relative prices and costs or devaluations
and revaluations of bilateral and multilateral
rates, adjustments that were difficult to make
and which would, in turn, have required fur-
ther adjustments.
There is a plausible case to he made on the
other side—that devaluation of the dollar’ would
have prolonged the life of the Bretton Woods
system. The key assumption is that the oil pro-
ducing countries raised the price of oil in re-
sponse to the decline in their real incomes after
the dollar floated. A modest devaluation to a
new fixed parity might have avoided the first oil
shock. If so, the mistaken policies in the United
States, attempting to offset the real effects of
the oil price rise by inflation, would have been
avoided. Inflation would have been lower and
U.S. nominal gold reserves larger. It seems
unlikely, however, that other countries would
have accepted a U.S. policy of inflation and
repeated, periodic devaluation against gold.
Without a lower rate of inflation in the United
States, the Bretton Woods system %vould have
failed sooner or later.
Nevertheless, the French proposal was a
straightforward solution to the liquidity prob-
lem of the 1960s. It would have resolved the li-
quidity problem at least for a time but would
not have resolved the more difficult “adjustment
problems” arising from changes in countries’
prices productivity, and costs of production.
This was not the main reason for rejecting the
proposal, however. Representatives of the gov-
ernments and central banks claimed that any
change in the $35 gold price or devaluation by
a reserve currency country would damage
“confidence.”
confidence
Throughout the 1960s, there were concerns
about whether the United States could avoid
default on its obligation to convert dollars into
gold at the $35 gold price. Expressions of lack
of confidence in the dollar often brought forth
speeches by Presidents, Treasury secretaries
and others to bolster “confidence.” Words were
not the only response. Actions were taken to
strengthen or restore confidence.
The dollar and, to a lesser extent, the pound
had a special role in the Bretton Woods system.
They were “reserve currencies.”” Central banks
held dollar or pound securities as reserves in I
sterling bloc. The dollar’s robe evolved from the dollar bloc







“The use of reserve currencies was not part of the Bretton
Woods plan. Britain’s role evolved from its prewar position
and the holding of sterling balances by countries in the













‘9See Schwartz (1987), p. 342.
4°Unitlabor costs (ULC) are available for Canada, Japan,
Germany and the United Kingdom from 1963 to date. The
index of foreign ULC is based on these countries. All data
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are from OECD, Main Economic /ndicafors, Historical
Statistics, 1990. The weights are Federal Reserve trade
weights normalized to sum to unity. 1985 is taken as the
base year for United States and the trade weighted ULC.
place of gold to earn interest on their balances.
Devaluation reduces the real value of these re-
serves, so anticipation of a devaluation could
lead to a run on the dollar or the pound. Once
total claims against the reserve currencies ex-
ceeded the gold reserves held by the United
States and Britain, discussion of the confidence
problem intensified.
The first evidence of a lack of confidence in
the dollar was a temporary rise in the gold price
in 1960. In October, the gold price on the Lon-
don market moved above the official inter-
vention price, $35.20 an ounce. Speculators said
that the market was concerned about the possi-
ble election of John F. Kennedy as president
and the continued capital outflow from the
United States. Kennedy’s talk of “getting the
economy moving” may have seemed inflationary.
To counter these concerns, Kennedy made a
strong commitment to maintain the gold value
of the dollar, and the Eisenhower administration took the first steps (discussed above) to reduce
the U.S. payments deficit.
The temporary increase in the London gold price reflected both a rising demand for gold
from European central banks and private hold-
ers and a refusal by the United States to supply
gold to the market. ‘The London gold pr-ice was
set to clear trading. To maintain the price
within its band, the Bank of England bought or
sold gold for dollars, replacing the dollars or gold in an exchange with the U.S. Treasury. In
October 1960. the ‘Treasury appeared unwilling
to restore the Bank’s gold holdings, so the Bank refused to buy dollars for gold. With the resid- ual buyer of dollars inactive, actual and pro-
spective supply was reduced; the price of gold rose to $40 on October 27. The Treasury re- sumed sales, and the price returned to $35.
Two changes were introduced as a result of
this experience. European central banks agreed
not to buy gold on the London market if the
price rose above the U.S. price plus shipping
cost, $35.20. In October 1961, seven European
governments and the United States cr’eated a
gold pool. Each member of the pool agreed to
let the Bank of England buy and sell for the group, and each received a pro-rata share of any gold purchases and supplied a share of gold
sales. During the years that the pool functioned,
member countries sold gold worth (net) $2.5
billion on the London market. ‘The U.S. share
was $1.6 billion.” As shown in figure 1, during
approximately the same period, 1961-67, U.S.
gold reserves fell more than $5 billion, the dif-
ference reflecting direct sales from the U.S.
gold stock. But, as noted earlier, during the
same period, the countries in the G-10, and
especially France, added more than 100 million
ounces ($3.5 billion) to their official gold
reserves. The amount added by the G-10
represents 97 percent of the sales by the United
States outside the gold pool. ‘These data suggest
that the pool did not function as intended; the
G-l0 replaced their sales from U.S. stocks.
The years 1962-64 saw a substantial increase
in the U.S. current account surplus and reduc-
tion in the payments imbalance. ‘The gold out-
flow, figure 1, slowed. Part of the improvement
resulted from the restrictions on military and
other purchases abroad, but part was the result
of rising exports, achieved despite the relatively
robust economic expansion in 1963 and 1964.
Figure 4 shows quarterly data on the current
account balance (in billion of dollars) from 1960
to the end of the Bretton Woods system. After
the increase in the surplus, to 1964, there is a
steady decline interrupted by the recession of
1969-70. The temporary surplus of 1970 was
soon replaced by a deficit that eliminated the ef-
fects of the surplus; the observations for 1972
are on a straight line fitted to the data for the
second half of the 1960s.
To slow the growth of dollar reserves abroad,
the United States had to reverse the current ac-
count balance sufficiently to cover private invest-
ment abroad, transfers, and other capital flows,
not in any particular year, but over time. By
this standard, policy can be said to have failed
to offset the negative trend in the current ac-
count balance after 1964.
One reason for the rising surplus in the U.S.
current account balance in the early 1960s is
that foreign costs rose relative to U.S. costs.
Figure 5 shows the unit labor costs (ULC) for
the United States relative to unit labor costs















third quarter 1963, then reverses to reach a
local peak in fourth quarter 1968. The current
account (figure 4) has a similar movement; al-
though its local peak is a bit earlier, the balance
remains relatively higher until second quarter
1965. The trough of the current account is also
in second quarter 1968. The next swing contin-
ues the negative relation. The current account
rises until early 1970 while the ULC ratio falls.
Thereafter, the two charts move together, fall-
ing until the end of Bretton Woods. A sharp
declinein the ULC ratio accompanied the decline
in the trade balance until 1972.
The comparison suggests that until 1970 or
1971, changes in the current account balance
are consistent with the movements of relative
costs. After 1970 the situation changed. The fall
in the current account is not the result of a
worsening of the competitive position of the
United States as reflected in relative costs of
production. The fall in relative costs may have
continued to increase the current account bal-
ance, but their influence was more than offset
by pressures in the opposite direction.
One possible explanation of the change in
1970-71 is that relative real rates of return to
capital moved against the dollar. Such move-
ments should be reflected in relative real rates
of interest. Figure 6 shows the ratio of the cx
post U.S. real interest rate to a trade weighted
average of real interest rates using Federal
Reserve trade weights.~’‘The figure shows the
41The Federal Reserve uses shares of world trade to set in-
dividual country weights. The real interest rate index for
foreign countries is based on Treasury bills for Canada
and the United Kingdom and call money rates for Ger-
many and Japan. The Federal Reserve trade weights are
standardized for the four countries to sum to unity. Infla-
tion is measured by the consumer price index for each
country. The ratio shown uses three-month moving
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ratio of a three-month, non-centered, moving average of the U.S. short-term interest rate to a three-month moving average of short-term rates
abroad.
All rates have been adjusted for infla-
tion in the particular country.
These data show that from 1960 to 1969, U.S.
real interest rates rose on average relative to
rates abroad. The sharp rise in U.S. rates from
1962 to 1964 contributed to the reduction in
the net capital outflow and is reflected in the
rise in current account surplus. The movement
of relative interest rates, on average, reinforced
the effect of falling relative costs of production




rate of interest continued to rise, but the rise
was too small to reverse the falling current ac-
count balance. And the increase in relative in-
terest rates in the United States was apparently
too small to prevent the very large capital out-
flow in that period. The path of relative interest
rates does not explain the collapse of the cur-
rent account balance and the large capital out-
flow in the early 1970s.
Relative interest rates give little evidence of a
grovving lack of confidence in the dollar in the
late 1960s. A flight from the dollar would have
pushed real U.S. interest rates above rates in
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devaluation and a run on the dollar. With few
exceptions real rates in the United States were
below rates abroad, on average about 10 per-
cent below from 1966 to 1972. There is no evi-
dence of a sustained rise in U.S. rates. The
Federal Reserve pumped out monetary base to
hold down interest rates. The rest of the world
absorbed the dollar outflow with little change in
real U.S. rates relative to rates abroad. ‘The main
exception is a spike in 1968-69 that mainly re-
flects a decline in the weighted average of real
rates abroad.
The data on relative real rates of interest sug-
gest that the Federal Reserve made little effort
to slow or stop the capital flow. During the win-
ter of 1971 relative real rates in the United
States fell until March along with U.S. real rates,
despite the large dollar outflow. The rise in rel-
ative rates in the spring and summer reflects
both a decline in foreign rates and a rise in
U.S. rates.
The gold and foreign exchange markets also
give little evidence of a lack of confidence lead-
ing to a flight from the dollar during the 1960s.
An exception is the winter of 1968 when the
gold price rose and the two-tier market began.
By 1969, the gold price in the free London mar-
ket had fallen back to $35.2 per ounce. The
same cannot he said for the other reserve cur-
rency, the pound sterling. By 1964, the pound




































tue to gold and the dollar. Repeated attempts to
reduce the pressure each succeeded for a short
time, then failed. Finally in November 1967, Bri-
tain devalued by 14.3 percent (from $2.80 to
$2.40). Members of the old sterling bloc
followed.
Pressure to devalue sterling occurred against
a worsening problem of U.S. domestic inflation
and a deteriorating relative cost position (figure
5). The Johnson administration’s main efforts to
slow price and wage increases were limited to
exhortation (jawboning). These efforts extended
to interest rates. With short-term interest rates
fixed by the Federal Reserve (figure 2a), rising
demand for goods and services and anticipations
of higher inflation encouraged increased bor-
rowing and higher money growth. As shown in
figure 2b, the annual growth of the monetary
base rose in 1965. Base growth reached the
highest rate experienced in the postwar years
to that time. Efforts to hold down rates paid on
time deposits under Regulation Q ceilings added
to the pressure on the banks. Depositors drew
on balances to purchase securities in the open
markets at home or abroad.
Early in December 1965, the Federal Reserve
raised the discount rate from 4 to 4-1/2 percent
and raised ceiling rates on time deposits. Al-
though President Johnson criticized the change
publicly, the higher rates remained in effect. As is often the case, however, the increase was too little and too late. Annual growth of the mone-
tary base from the same month a year earlier
did
not decline until the second half of 1966, as
shown in figure 2b. Inflation rose early in 1966.
U.S. interest rates, after adjusting for inflation,
fell relative to foreign rates (figure 6). Declines
in relative unit labor costs and relative consumer
prices ended, Reflecting these changes, the nom-
inal current account balance plunged in the five
quarters following the December 1965 decision,
eliminating most of the increase achieved in the
previous six years.
The Federal Reserve made a short-lived effort
to slow the inflation in 1966. The federal funds
rate rose and the growth of the monetary base
contracted in the second half of the year. Re-
sponding to the less inflationary policy, sensitive
measures of prices, such as the producer price
index, reversed direction of change, falling from
the local peak in third quarter 1966 to a local
trough in second quarter 1967. A six-month aver-
age of consumer prices fell from a4percent
annual rate in January 1966 to 1.3 percent in
February 1967. Given the upward bias in con-
sumer prices, resulting from the heavy weight
on service prices (that are not adjusted for pro-
ductivity and quality changes in inputs and out-
puts), it appears that the Federal Reserve had
stopped the inflation. But, as figures 2a and 2b
show, the Federal Reserve did not continue the
policy. Federal funds remained at 4 percent for
most of 1967 despite clear evidence of recovery.
By early 1968, consumer prices were rising at
a 3 to 4 percent annual rate and, more impor-
tantly for the payments problem, rising relative
to a weighted average of foreign prices. Relative
unit labor costs rose sharply. The effects of
changes in relative costs and prices on the U.S.
payments position were partially hidden at first
by a capital inflow from Europe; U.S. banks had
began borrowing from the Eurodollar market.
In part, this reflected the rise in relative rates
of interest by 0.25 in the United States (figure
6), in part efforts to circumvent ceilings on time
deposits including, at the time, all certificates of
deposit (regardless of denomination). The result
was a payments surplus in 1966, the first since
1957, and repayment of earlier Treasury and
Federal Reserve borrowing from central banks
and governments.42
Confidence in the administration’s ability to
maintain convertibility into gold or avoid deval-
uation reached a temporary low early in 1968.
The immediate problem began with a run on
gold when Britain devalued. The gold pool sold
$800 million in November 1967. The run subsid-
ed in January, following the announcement that
President Johnson had placed new controls on
foreign investment by businesses, banks and
financial institutions.
Demands for gold rose again in March. Rumors
that the gold pool would end and the low cost
of speculating against a price that could fall
very little encouraged renewed speculation. After
sales of $400 million on March 14, the London
gold pool closed the next day. That marked the
end of the gold pool. The market did not reopen
until April. When it did, central banks no
42See Solomon (1982), p. 102.
43Haberler (1965) was one of the first to emphasize the
greater importance of the adjustment problem relative to
the liquidity problem, but neither his remonstrance nor
others had much effect on official proposals. See also
Friedman (1953).longer supported the market price. There was
now a two-tier market. Private transactors
could buy and sell at the market determined
price, although the 1934 ban on U.S. citizens’
ownership of gold remained. Transactions bet-
ween central banks were placed outside the
market and continued at the $35 price. Also,
the governments agreed that gold would not be
sold by the members of the former pool to
replace any central bank sales to the private
market.
The central bank governors’ communique’ put
a positive interpretation on their announcement,
repeated their intention to maintain existing
parities, and referred to the then forthcoming
agreement to establish the SDR. It made no
mention of adjustment of parities.~3The central
banks agreed to ‘no longer supply gold to the
London gold market or any other gold market,”
but they hedged their statement to retain the
possibility of buying gold.~~ The two-tier agree-
ment remained in effect until November 1973.
The fl-ce market gold price went to $38 per
ounce, suggesting that the market would have
been satisfied by 10 to 15 percent devaluation
of the dollar. For the rest of the year, the free
market price remained between $38 and $43.
Then the price fell back to $35 to absorb an
increased supply of South African gold.”
For the year 1968 as a whole, the United
States had a surplus in the balance of payments.
The reason is that banks continued to borrow
in the Eurodollar market and, following the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, foreign inves-
tors purchased U.S. assets.” These decisions
and events produced a payments surplus in
1968 despite a further decline of $2 billion to
$0.6 billion in the current account surplus.
One lasting effect of the winter’s events was
the elimination of the gold reserve requirement
for Federal Reserve notes. On March 12, Con-
gress abolished the 25 percent gold reserve
behind Federal Reserve notes. The legislation
removed one of the last links between gold and
the dollar in the original Federal Reserve Act.
The initial requirement ratios, or backing, for
bank reserves and currency had first been re-
duced, then eliminated for bank reserves and,
finally, eliminated for currency. The stated pur-
pose was to make the gold stock available to de-
fend the $35 price. In fact, central banks did
not again convert dollars into gold until 1971.
The two-tier system and the decision by cen-
tral banks to refrain from converting dollars in-
to gold had an unanticipated effect on the soon
to be created SDRs. The United States had spon-
sored SDRs and urged their use as a substitute
for gold in central bank reserves. Since central
banks refrained from selling gold, and bought
newly mined gold from South Africa and the
Soviet Union, issues of SDRs served as a substi-
tute for dollars in central bank reserves.
Looking back after the fact, it is surprising
how small was the loss of confidence in the dol-
lar as a reserve currency before 1971. Central
banks and governments preferred to absorb
dollars rather than revalue their currencies.
Some private speculators purchased gold or
other assets, but the purchases were not large
enough to move the equilibrium gold price per-
sistently above the fixed price until 1970.
Meeting after meeting during the last five
years of Bietton Woods mentioned the three
problems: confidence, liquidity, and adjustment.
Central bank governors, ministers and their
staffs gave most of their attention to liquidity
and then to confidence. Aside from a few re-
latively small changes in parities, little was done
about adjustment. The attitude of the IMF is
representative of the period. Their 1969 report
mentions adjustment of par values, following
the French devaluation. The discussion reached
only one conclusion: the par value system should
be retained.~~
THE END OF BRETTON WOODS I
Concern about the rising budget deficit, the
payments problem and inflation led Congress in
June 1968 to accept the Johnson administration’s
proposed 10 percent income tax surcharge and,
in return, to require the administration to
reduce the growth of government spending.
The response of the Federal Reserve was almost
immediate; they reduced the federal funds rate
in an attempt to mix easier monetary policy
with tighter fiscal policy. Growth of the mone-
tary base declined briefly, then rose to a 7 per-
cent annual rate of increase (figure 2b). The six
month average rate of increase of consumer
445ee Solomon (1982), p. 122.
“Ibid., p. 124.
46Jbid., p. 105.








aprices rose at a 4 percent rate in 1968 but the
annualized rate of increase was 6.5 percent at
the end of the year.
U.S. consumer prices now began to rise rela-
tive to a trade weighted average of prices abroad
(figure 3), reversing the trend decline of the
early 1960s. Unit labor costs rose sharply rela-
tive to costs abroad (figure 5). The trade and
payments position deteriorated; real net exports
(1982 dollars) fell to —$30 bilhon in 1968 and
—$35 billion in 1969 from —$17 billion in 1967
after a $6 billion surplus in 1964. As shown in
Figure 4, the nominal current account balance
continued to fall in 1968, reversed briefly dur-
ing the 1969-70 recession, then resumed its
decline.
The official settlements measure of the balance
of payments shows the United States in surplus
in 1968 and 1969 for the first time in the
decade.48 This was misleading, much of it the
proximate result of Regulation Q ceilings on
personal and corporate time deposits. As U.S.
interest rates rose above the legal ceiling rates,
commercial banks lost time deposits to the Euro-
dollar market.” The U.S. banks then borrowed
in the Eurodollar market acquiring many of the
deposits they had lost and some additional funds.
The effect was to have a large inflow of short-
term capital, $4.3 billion on the official settle-
ments basis for the two years.
Interest rates fell during the 1970 recession,
real rates declined on average relative to rates
abroad, and the capital flow reversed with a
vengeance. The official settlements deficit of
—$9.8 billion was by far the largest to that
time. But this flow was soon dwarfed by the
—$31 billion outflow in the first three quarters
of 1971.~°
Figure 1 shows the surge in liabilities to
foreign central banks and governments. These
liabilities more than doubled to $50 billion in
1970, then rose another $11 billion in 1971. The
classic response to a capital outflow for a coun-
try on a fixed exchange rate is to raise interest
rates and reduce money growth. The Federal
Reserve did the opposite, the federal funds rate
fell from a peak of 9 percent early in 1970 to
less than 4 percent the following year. Growth
of the monetary base rose from 4 to 8 percent
annual rate in the same period.
To any outside observer, it must have been
clear that the United States did not intend to
follow the classical rules or the policies of a
country that intended to maintain a fixed ex-
change rate. The run from the dollar began.
Foreign central banks experienced large in-
creases in dollar reserves. Germany added $3.1
billion in the first six months of the year. Ger-
man money growth rose from 6.4 percent in
1970 to 12.0 percent in 1971. German consumer
prices, which had increased 1.8 percent in 1969
rose 5.3 percent in 1971. Despite rigid exchange
controls, Japan could not escape the direct ef-
fect of U.S. money growth through the trade
account. Japan’s reserves nearly tripled in the
first nine months of 1971, rising $8.6 billion.
The Japanese money stock (M1) rose more than
25 percent in 1971. Other countries had qualita-
tively similar experience.
In 1969, after much delay, Germany had closed
the foreign exchange market, allowed the mark
to float, then revalued by 9.3 percent on Octo-
ber 24. Within two years, three major curren-
cies—the British pound, the French franc and
the German mark—had been forced to change
exchange rates.” The belief that economic
stability required exchange rate stability began
to erode.
The 1971 capital flow dwarfed previous ex-
perience. The U.S. deficit on capital account
was almost $30 billion for the full year 1971
and $42 billion for the two years 1970-71. Of
this amount, $40 billion became dollar reserves
of other countries. Japan and Germany accumu-
lated $11 billion each, more than half the total,
and the United Kingdom acquired nearly $10
billion.” On May 5, seven European countries
closed their foreign exchange markets. The Ger-
man Finance Minister, Schiller, tried to persuade
principal European countries to agree to a joint
float, but France and Italy opposed. Four days
later the mark and the Dutch guilder began to
float. Switzerland revalued by 7 percent and
Austria by 5 percent.53 Belgium, with a split cx-
aThe official settlements balance measures the change in
reserve assets minus the change in short- and long-term liabilities to foreign official institutions (central banks or in- ternational agencies).
49A Eurodollar is a dollar deposit liability of a European
based bank, including European branches of U.S. banks.
50See ERP (1972), p. 150.
51France devalued by 11.1 percent on August 10, 1969.
Canada floated its currency against gold in May 1970.
“See IMF (1972), p. 15.


















change rate, allowed the financial rate to float
up. Early in August, faced with slow recovery
from the recession, rising inflation, a persistent
payments deficit, and fifteen months to election
day, President Nixon decided to change economic
policy. After meeting at Camp David on the
weekend of August 13 to 15, he ended the fixed
exchange rate system by suspending temporar-
ily the convertibility of the dollar into gold or
other reserve assets.”
The plan announced on August 15 included
much more than the suspension of gold conver-
tibility. Wages and prices were frozen for 90
days, allegedly to stop inflation then running at
an annual rate of 3 percent for the six months
ending in July. Tax credits to increase employ-
ment and investment were introduced to in-
crease demands for output and labor’ and to
reduce unemployment below 6 percent. A 10
percent surcharge was put on imports.” By the
end of August, all major currencies except the
French franc floated against the dollar.” The
last remaining tie of the dollar to gold had
been severed, at least temporarily.
Many of the changes announced on August 15
had been discussed for some time in advance.
Chairman Burns of the Federal Reserve had ad-
vocated a price-wage policy for months. John
Connolly, the secretary of the Treasury, favor-ed
strong action on trade and inflation. Stein
reports that President Nixon and Connolly had
agreed in the spring that they would impose
price and wage controls if foreign demand for
gold required them to close the gold window.”
‘The triggering event was renewed demands
for gold from France and Britain. On August 8,
the press reported that France would ask for
$191 million in gold to make a scheduled repay-
ment to the IMF. Later in the same week, on
August 13, Britain also requested to exchange
dollars for gold. The combined requests were
small in comparison with the $12 billion in-
crease in foreign holdings of dollars in the first
nine months of 1971. Reports of demands for
gold, however, generated fears of a run against
the remaining U.S. gold reserve.57 President
Nixon and his principal advisers met at Camp
David on the weekend of August 13 to 15 to
adopt the program based on the agreement
reached by Nixon and Connolly in the spring.”
The earlier policy had been called ‘steady as
you go.” In fact, U.S. monetary policy had been
far from steady in 1970-71. The federal funds
rate was driven down from 9 percent early in
1970 to 3.7 percent in March 1971, then in-
creased 5.3 percent in July. During the same
period, growth of the monetary base increased
from 4 percent to 8 percent. The effect, given
policies abroad, was to lower U.S. short-term in-
terest rates relative to a trade-weighted average
of rate abroad as shown in figure 6.” The de-
cline in relative real interest rates ended in
March, then reversed but, by March, the dollar’s
fixed exchange rate was falling, reflecting grow-
ing fears of devaluation. These fears strength-
ened as currencies began to float or revalue
against the dollar.
When asset markets opened on Monday
August 16, traders greeted the new economic
policy enthusiastically. U.S. interest rates fell
and stock prices rose. Many of the foreign ex-
change markets abroad were closed, but in the
United States and, later in markets overseas, the
dollar depreciated against most currencies. An
exception is the Canadian dollar which remain-
ed in a narrow hand for the rest of the year.
The Japanese yen was at the other extreme; it
revalued by about 5 percent initially and rose
10 percent by the end of September despite
much intervention by the Bank of Japan. Be-
tween December 1970 and July 1971, the trade
weighted index of the real U.S. exchange I-ate
“More precisely, the surtax was used to raise import duties
no higher than their statutory level from which tariff reduc-
tions had been made. For autos, the increase was, there-
fore, 6.5 percent (ERP, 1972, p. 148). Shultz and Dam
(1977), p. 115 explain that the surcharge was to be used
as a bargaining chip to keep other countries from following
the U.S. devaluation against gold. U.S. policy was to
devalue against gold and other currencies. The surcharge
raised the price of U.S. imports, so devalued the dollar
against other currencies until they agreed to a formal
devaluation.
“France adopted a dual exchange rate with financial tran-
sactions at a floating rate.
“See Stein (1988), p. 166. Herbert Stein was a member and
later chairman of President Nixon’s Council of Economic
Advisers. The decision was told only to George Shultz,
director of the Office of Management and Budget and Paul
McCracken, chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers.
“See Shultz and Dam (1977), p. 110; Stein (1988). p. 166.
“Arthur Burns, chairman of the Board of Governors, par-
ticipated in the meeting despite the independence of the
Federal Reserve. Burns also participated in the administra-
tion’s program as chairman of the Committee on Interest
and Dividends.
“The local peak in the relative rate is 1.27 in January 1969.
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declined by approximately 3 percent; between
I . July and the end of December 1971 the rate fell an additional 6.5 percent, so real devaluation
for the year was approximately 9.4 percent.
Figure 7 shows the real exchange rate for
the dollar against a trade-weighted basket of cur-
rencies using Federal Reserve weights. Since
there are few pamity changes prior to 1971, the
real exchange rate reflects mainly relative price
changes. Hence, figure 7 for the most part dup-
licates figure 3 until 1971. Thereafter, the two
charts differ; the real exchange rate reflects
both the devaluation of the nominal exchange









The price-wage freeze, the surtax on imports
and the floating dollar were thought to be tem-
poraiy measures. There is no evidence that the
administration had developed a long-term pro-
gram by August 15, but they began to do so.
The 1972 Economic Report summarizes some
of their thinking by discussing three questions.
Should realignment occur through market adjust-
ment or negotiation? How large is the structural
or permanent deficit? How should the reduction
in the U.S. payments deficit he distributed
among other trading countries? In practice, the
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of exchange rates, so the issue was the size of
relative revaluations against the dollar.” Other
countries, particularly France, wanted acknowl-
edgment by the United States of its past infla-
tion in the form of a devaluation against gold.
Perhaps more important was the effect on
country wealth. A devaluation by the United
States raised the value of country gold stocks
while a devaluation by other countries reduced
the value of their dollar assets.
In the first nine months of 1971 the U.S.
short-term capital outflow rose to $23 billion,
and the basic balance declined to —$10.2 billion.
At an annual rate, these outflows were equiva-
lent to the entire short-term capital outflow for
1960-69. The outflow includes capital flight from
the United States in anticipation of devaluation
and a deteriorating current account balance. In
part, deterioration reflected the worsening rela-
tion in U.S. prices relative to foreign prices. The
ratio of U.S. consumer prices to trade weighted
consumer prices in figure 3 shows an increase
of four percentage points between 1966 and the
end of 1970.
Although Treasury Undersecretary Paul
Volcker had testified in June that the basic im-
balance was about $2.5 to $3 billion, Volcker
now argued for a $13 billion adjustment to
reach equilibrium.” The United States favored a
period of free floating and offered to remove
the 10 percent surcharge on imports if other
countries would remove barriers to trade. In-
stead central banks intervened, and govern-
ments imposed exchange controls. Exchange
rates were not permitted to adjust freely; new
rates were negotiated.
The Smithsonian Agreement
In December, finance ministers and central
bank governors met at the Smithsonian Institu-
tion in Washington to agree on a new set of
exchange rates. Gold was repriced at $38 per
ounce, and bands on exchange rates were rais-
ed from 1 percent to Z.25 percent of central
rates. The United States eliminated the 10 per-
cent surcharge on imports, and the principal
countries agreed to discuss reductions of trade
barriers.”
The agreement on devaluation of the dollar
against gold raised, or more accurately, con-
tinued a problem. The official gold price re-
mained below the open market price that had
now reached $42. Central banks, therefore, had
an incentive to convert dollars into gold and sell
the gold on the open market. ‘The “solution” was
to raise the official price but not require the
dollar to be convertible into gold!
The new exchange rates revalued the mark
by 13.6 percent against the dollar, the yen by
16.9 percent, the pound and the French franc
by 8.6 percent, and most other European cur-
rencies by 7.5 to 11,6 percent. The Federal
Reserve’s calculation showed a trade weighted
devaluation of the dollar of 6.5 percent against
all currencies and 10 percent against the cur-
rencies of the Group of 10. The devaluation was
estimated to produce an $8 billion swing in the
U.S. trade balance in two to three years.63 The
IMF estimated the dollar devaluation as 7.9 per-
cent of its former par value.” The effect of all
the parity changes was to raise the world im-
port prices by about 7.5 percent.65
Prior to the agreement, inflexibility and lack
of an adjustment mechanism had been major
problems. Surplus countries had been reluctant
to revalue because of the effects of their exports
on domestic employment. The United States had
been unwilling to devalue against gold. Many
countries had relied on exchange controls to
strengthen their currencies.
The Smithsonian agreement took two steps to
improve adjustment. The gold price changed,
opening the possibility of further changes, and
the dollar was devalued against the leading cur-
rencies. In addition, cross rates of exchange
were altered to reflect, partially, the changes in
the world financial system. Also, the 2-1/4 per-
cent band on exchange rates permitted diver-
gence of up to 4.5 percent. But, nothing was
done to provide an orderly procedure for chang-
ing parities when there were persistent deficits
or surpluses. The system remained relatively in-
flexible and poorly designed for the event
which it soon faced.
“See ERP (1972), p. 149.
61See Solomon (1982), p. 192-93; ERP (1972), p. 154. The
$13 billion included a$ 6billion surplus to provide for len-
ding to developing countries.
“Secretary Connally’s initial position included renegotiation
of defense costs, but this issue was dropped. The discus-
sion of trade barriers produced very few changes.
(Solomon, 1982), p. 191.
“See Solomon (1982), p. 211.


























President Nixon called the agreement “the
most significant monetary agreement in the
history of the world.”69 In fact, it was a modest
agreement that lasted less than fifteen months.
Within a few months stresses reappeared in the
international monetary system. In June, Britain
decided to let the pound float. Within a month
17 members of the sterling bloc followed. In the
same month, Germany imposed controls on cap-
ital inflows for the first time since the 1950s.°’
The underlying problem was that U.S. policy
remained inconsistent with maintenance of a
fixed exchange rate system. Despite the price
controls introduced in August 1971, the report-
ed rate of change in consumer prices in 1972
was only 1 percent lower than in 1971. More
importantly, the future did not look promising.
The Federal Reserve made no effort to restrict
money growth. Despite a surge in aggregate de-
mand and industrial production, the federal
funds rate was reduced to below 3-1/2 percent
early in the year and was held below 5 percent
until the November election. Growth of the
monetary base remained above 6-1/2 percent,
and growth of M1 increased to 7 percent. Nomi-
nal imports surged, reflecting the devaluation
and the strong economic expansion. For the
year as a whole, real net exports were —$49
billion, a 20 per-cent rise in a singleyear and
the largest deficit to that time. The nominal cur-
rent account balance remained negative, —$5.8
billion, more than four times the deficit of the
previous year.
For a few months in the summer and fall, the
dollar stabilized. Prices in the United States de-
clined relative to trade weighted prices abroad
(figure 3) and, until September, U.S. real inter-
est rates rose relative to trade weighted real
rates abroad (figure 6). The rise in the relative
real interest rate during the fall and early win-
ter was small, however, in relation to the capi-
tal outflow.
In late January 1973, a new foreign exchange
crisis began. Italy announced a two-tier exchange
F market to discourage capital outflows. Switzer-
land floated to reduce the flow from Italy and
to control money growth. Pressure shifted to
Germany and Japan. Within two weeks, Japan
floated, and the Europeans closed their foreign
exchange markets to halt the inflow of dollars.”
The United States made its last attempt to re-
tain the par value system. On February 12, the
dollar was devalued by 10 percent (to $42.22).
Since the United States did not intervene to
maintain the new price, the action was more
symbol than substance. Secretary Shultz (who
had replaced Connally the previous summer)
also announced an end to U.S. exchange con-
trols, including the interest equalization tax and
restrictions on foreign loans and investments
scheduled for December 1974.69
Within a few weeks, there was a renewed
flight from the dollar, requiring additional pur-
chases by foreign central banks under the rules.
During the first quarter of the year, foreign
central banks, mainly in the G-10, bought an ad-
ditional $10 billion. The addition was more than
17 percent of total G-10 foreign exchange bal-
ances at the end of 1972.~°The new purchases
were sufficient to convince most countries to
bring the Bretton Woods system to an end. The
Europeans agreed on a joint float against the
dollar and other currencies. The yen had floated
earlier. De facto fluctuating exchanges rates
became the norm for major currencies.
~THY BRETTON WOODS FAILED
In retrospect, the Bretton Woods system of
fixed but adjustable exchange rates appears to
have failed for two main reasons. First, the sys-
tern was poorly designed, and the flaws became
more apparent as time passed. Second, the
United States did not pursue the monetary pol-
icy necessary to maintain a fixed exchange rate.
On a few occasions, interest rates may have
been raised to support the exchange rates (or to
slow the capital flow), but monetary policy con-
centrated almost exclusively on a variety of
domestic objectives. This was particularly true
when the climax came in 1970-72.
The Flaws in Bretton Woods
The designers of the Bretton Woods system
wanted to reduce the role of gold and make ad-
“See the Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1971.
OlpreviousIy Germany used reserve requirements on foreign
deposits to reduce capital inflows. In June 1973 sales of
German securities to foreigners were prohibited.
“The Bundesbank purchased $5 billion in the week ending
February 9, 1973.
“See Pauls (1990), p. 897-98.
~°IMFYearbook (1990).justment by deficit and surplus countries more
nearly symmetrical. One of the designers, John
Maynard Keynes, believed that with fixed but
adjustable exchange rates and adjustment by
both deficit and surplus countries, fluctuations
in economic activity would be reduced; deficit
countries would not be forced to contract, or
would contract less, when faced with a tem-
porary loss of reserves; instead, surplus coun-
tries would lend to deficit countries. In this
way, fluctuations in output would be damped.
There were two problems with this plan for
adjustment. First, surplus countries had no in-
centive to adjust, and they were generally reluc-
tant to do so. Keynes had proposed a penalty
on surplus countries that accumulated reserves,
but this proposal was eliminated early in the
development of the Bretton Woods system.” Se-
cond, policymakers could not distinguish a tem-
porary disequilibrium, to be resolved by bor-
rowing and lending, from a permanent disequil-
ibrium requiring a change in par values. In
practice, the system became more rigid with the
passage of time. Britain delayed devaluation for
several years before 1967. France delayed de-
valuation in 1968. Germany, Japan and other
surplus countries delayed revaluations. Japan
supported the yen for a few weeks even after
August 15, 1971, by intervening sizably to slow
the yen’s appreciation.’2
The flaws in the system appeared quickly, al-
though they were not always recognized as
such. A starting point for the full operation of
the system is 1959, when currencies became
convertible. By 1968, the dollar was tie facto
inconvertible into gold. Although the Bretton
Woods system stumbled through the next several
years, foreign central banks and governments,
after March 1968, were discouraged from con-
verting dollars into gold and did not do so.
When some tried to convert, in August 1971,
the U.S. formalized the restriction that had
been in effect for more than three years by
refusing to sell gold.
During the 10 years, 1959-68, from the move
to convertibility to the effective embargo on
U.S. gold, restrictions on trade and payments
grerv. The United States paid considerable costs
to avoid buying supplies abroad for its troops in
Europe and Asia. Much foreign aid was tied to
purchases from the United States. Restriction of
capital movements by Britain, the United States
and other countries made the payments system
highly illiberal and complex.
The ideal of Bretton Woods was a system of
fixed but adjustable exchange rates among con-
vertible cuirencies. During its short life, the goal
became increasingly one of maintaining fixed
rates. Adjustment of exchange rates and conver-
tibility of the dollar into gold were lost. Presi-
dent Nixon’s August 1971 decision, in this light,
should be seen as a choice of adjustment over
gold convertibility.
[J.& Policy
The professed principal aims of U.S. interna-
tional economic policy included maintaining con-
vertibility into gold and sustaining the Bretton
Woods system. The policy failed in part because
it was often short-sighted or wrong, in part be-
cause the United States placed much more
weight on domestic concerns than on the main-
tenance of the world monetary system.
Throughout the 1960s, France urged, and
the United States opposed, a revaluation of gold.
The French argument was correct insofar as
it recognized that a devaluation of the dollar
against gold would increase the supply of world
reserves and reduce dependence on the dollar
as a reserve currency. The French were correct
also in insisting that gold had a long history as
an international money, but this argument con-
fused rather than clarified the issues under dis-
cussion. Devaluation of the dollar against gold
did not presuppose a change in the Bretton
Woods system. That system was based on the
dollar, a point that should have been completely
clear after March 1968 when, de facto, coun-
tries could no longer convert dollars into gold.
Had the United States agreed to revalue gold in
1965 or shortly after, it seems entirely possible
that the many discussions leading to the issuance
of SDRs would have been avoided and an ade-
quate solution found for the liquidity problem
much earlier. The U.S. policy delayed the solu-
tion until long past the time when it should
have been apparent that a solution to the liquid-
ity problem would not sustain the system.
llSee Meltzer (1988).
‘2The European exchange rate mechanism had much
greater flexibility in its early years, and Germany and the
Netherlands revalued several times. By the late 1980s,










Gold would have served as an effective means
of payment between central banks, a role that
the SDH did not acquire. More importantly for
the Bretton Woods system, a revalued gold stock,
if agreed to before 1968, could have imposed
some discipline on the United States to pay in
gold. Discipline was lacking once the de facto
embargo on gold was in place after March 1968.
Devaluation was not a panacea, however. Coun-
tries would have been unlikely to accept the
cost of high U.S. inflation and frequent large
devaluations against gold, so the system’s sur-
vival would have required some restriction on
U.S. policy. SDRs provided no discipline at all.
The arguments against gold revaluation were
weak. The principal arguments were: (1) a de-
valuation of the dollar against gold would not
solve the adjustment problem if other countries
devalued against the dollar; (2) an increase in
the gold price would benefit South Africa or
the Soviet Union; (3) the gold standard was
too rigid.
It is true that if all countries had devalued
against the dollar, exchange rates would have
remained fixed. But, the “liquidity” problem
would have been solved and perhaps part of
the “confidence” problem as well. Countries
would have taken losses on their dollar reserves,
but devaluation of the dollar would have reduc-
ed the risk that the system would collapse with
a run on the dollar. Simultaneous devaluation
would have focused attention on the adjustment
problem by removing the liquidity problem that
occupied so much time and attention.
Arguments about South Africa and the Soviet
Union addressed domestic political concerns.
These arguments had no practical relevance. In
the end, the revaluation of gold was not avoid-
ed. South Africa and the Soviet Union continued
to sell gold. The IMF established rules for pur-
chasing South African gold that accepted South
Africa’s right to sell gold in the market and to
member governments.
There is little reason to doubt that public opi-
nion in many countries wanted to avoid a return
to the gold standard. The gold standard was
widely viewed as an excessively rigid, 19th cen-
tury system. Some of the French, who favored
a greater role for gold, emphasized the “discipline
of gold” and the repayment of dollar and sterling
“See Rueff (1969).
‘4There were many other private proposals including pro-
posals for a world central bank. Haberler (1g66), p. g
liabilities.” They wrote as if they did not want
a more flexible system of adjustment; they
wanted greater discipline. They talked much
more about the losses on holdings of dollars
than the gain from a more stable, adjustable
monetary system. Although a return to a full
gold standard was not the consistent aim of
French policy toward the international mone-
tary system, their proposals and arguments
made it easy for others to dismiss their argu-
ments. Neither France nor other governments
offered alternative proposals under which U.S.
monetary policy would be subject to discipline.’~
Perhaps it was inevitable in the 1960s that any
alternative to U.S. policy would he dismissed.
The U.S. argument that the dollar could not
be devalued was, at most, a half truth. The
restrictions placed on various types of transac-
tions were partial devaluations that changed the
relative prices of those transactions. The most
obvious example was the interest equalization
tax which raised the cost of borrowing dollars.
Import-export bank subsidies lowered the cost
of favored U.S. exports. Other restrictions work-
ed in much the same way to selectively devalue
the dollar.
Some of the restrictions were so short-sighted
as to raise doubts about the purpose of the poli-
cy and the objectives of the policymakers. Re-
strictions on investment abroad by U.S. firms
are an obvious example. Absent the restrictions,
investment abroad would have been higher and
the capital outflow larger. But. profitable invest-
ment abroad would have produced a return
flow, increasing the current account surplus in
the future. Whatever short-term gain the re-
strictions achieved, they had long-term, negative
consequences. The problem was not a short-
term problem of maintaining the Bretton Woods
system for a few months or years. From a
longer perspective the restrictions on invest-
ment were counter-productive.
One reason for the investment restrictions
may have been that policymakers often focused
on the basic balance or broader measures such
as the official settlements balance. For these bal-
ances, U.S. long-term investment abroad is
equivalent to an import of goods and services.
Greater attention to the current account balance
refers to such proposals as endowing ‘the creation of



















would have shown the steady decline in that
balance, thereby concentrating attention on i-cia-
tive costs and prices. This focus would have
posed more sharply the basic issue: deflation or
devaluation. Reliance on investment controls
partially obscured this basic issue as well as
sacrificing the future for small, costly improve-
mments in the present.
The interest equalization tax was no less short-
sighted than the restrictions on investment. The
effect of the tax was to raise the cost of trading
in U.S. markets, thereby encouraging part of
the financial service industry to move abroad. A
long-term result was loss of the export of some
financial services.
By far the major flaw in U.S. policy, and the
most damaging feature of the Bretton Woods
system, was the failure to prevent U.S. inflation.
As the system developed, the United States was
able to choose domestic over international goals
whenever a choice had to be made. At times,
particularly in the early 1960s, U.S. nominal in-
terest rates were kept higher for a few weeks
or months to reduce the capital outflow. But
such choices usually were reversed if unemploy-
ment rose. U.S. policymakers typically chose ex-
pansion to deflation and used controls of vari-
ous kinds to get temporary reductions in the
capital outflow. And, after 1966, policymakers
adopted more inflationary policies than before.
Given the priority placed on employment and
other domestic goods, such as housing, price
stability was ruled out.
All of the responsibility for failure does not
fall on the United States, Germany, Japan and
others pursued export growth as a holy grail
and either made few efforts to adjust their ex-
change rates or none at all. Spokesmen for Ger-
many could point correctly to the inflationary
policies of the United States, and the failure of
the United States to adjust domestic policies so
as to honor international commitments, but they
were less forthright about the adjustment of
countries with sustained surpluses that had un-
dervalued currencies.” After the Bretton Woods
experience, Germany changed its policies toward
adjustment. In the European Monetary System,
Germany revalued frequently to keep that
system from experiencing the adjustment pro-
blems of Bretton Woods.
It is surprising how little attention was paid to
the adjustment problem. The Kennedy, Johnson
and Nixon administrations did not propose a
permanent solution.’°Each so-called crisis left
more controls on capital movements or other
transactions, but these efforts were not followed
by internal discussions of policies leading to a
long-term solution in which controls would be
removed. The Economic Reports of Presidents
Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon have lengthy sec-
tions each year on the international monetary
system, but the reports say little about adjust-
ment. ‘the typical comment was that surplus
countries should revalue or expand demand. The
explanation for neglect of adjustment is not that
such discussions were sensitive. Solomon (1982)
reports on the many meetings that were held
during these years. There are pages on pro-
posals and negotiations about liquidity, very lit-
tle discussion of adjustment. The G-10 and the
International Monetary Fund are no better.”
They, too, avoided the issue or limited their
comments to suggestions that surplus countries
expand without inflating. Even the devaluations
by Britain and France were not followed by
discussions of the effect of the devaluation on
the United States.
As the Bretton Woods system developed, it ac-
quired some of the characteristics its designers
had hoped to avoid. Major countries were reluc-
tant to change parities. Surplus countries argued
that adjustment was the responsibility of deficit
countries. Deficit countries made opposite argu-
ments, appealing to the need for symmetry.
The 1960s witnessed the beginning of efforts
to solve international monetary or economic
problems by coordinating policy actions. In
practice, this usually meant that surplus and
deficit countries were supposed to agree on dif-
ferent mixes of monetary and fiscal policy ac-
tions. Discussions produced few concrete steps.
Foreign countries accepted the expansions im-
plied by the flows of U.S. dollars, but they did
not systematically reduce government spending
or raise taxes to slowtheir expansions and lower
domestic interest rates. And, as discussed earlier,
the United States focused mainly on domestic
“See Emminger (1967) as an example. Otmar Emminger
was a director and later president ofthe Deutsche
Bundesbank.
“See Shultz and Dam (1971), p. 111. Milton Friedman sent
a long memo to President-elect Nixon in December 1968
urging a prompt, decisive change in policy. Nothing was
done. See Friedman (1988).










FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUIS a83
objectives. The dialogue about coordination, once
started, was hard to stop. It continued into the
1970s and 1980s. Countries that faced a balance
of payments deficit usually favored coordinated
action. Countries in surplus usually were
opposed.
The end of the Bretton Woods system was
followed by diverse predictions. Some saw fluc-
tuating exchange rates as a means of increasing
stability or domestic policy. Some warned about
the instability that would follow. It is now clear
that neither was correct. The warnings about
the consequences of the collapse of Bretton
Woods proved to be wrong. The inconvertible
dollar continued to function as an international
medium of exchange and store of value. The ac-
cumulation of dollar assets by foreign central
banks and governments continued to rise. By
the end of the 1970s, nominal dollar reserves of
the G-10 countries, excluding the United States,
had doubled from the level at the end of 1972.
In the next decade, these reserves doubled again
to more than $300 billion. Central banks and
governments continued to be more willing to
acquire additional dollars than to allow the
dollar to devalue.
The end of Bretton Woods improved the ad-
justment mechanism, but did not quickly elimi-
nate inflation or inflationary policies. Countries
gained the opportunity to pursue independent
policies. Inflation differed between major cur-
rencies but both governments and some private
individuals complained about the variability of
nominal and real exchange rates. During most
of the next 20 years, the principal currencies
continued to fluctuate.
However, countries did not float freely. Dirty
floating, managed exchange rates, intervention,
exchange controls and trade restrictions were
retained or introduced. Despite these policies
and complaints about excessive variability of ex-
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